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1 Introduction
The aggregate saving rate is an important economic indicator. When policy
makers make predictions about the saving rate they usually base their arguments
on some macroeconomic variables and, as an implication of the life-cycle theory,
the age structure of the population. Lately the role of generational diﬀerences
has been an issue in these predictions. In Norway, the general opinion is that
even though saving is expected to rise when the baby-boom generations come
into the high-saving phase of the life-cycle, this eﬀect will be muﬄed by the
fact that younger generations save less than older generations have done. In
the US, it is the generations born in the 1920s and 1930s that are believed to
have a lower saving propensity than other generations. These opinions seem to
prevail, even though there is little support in the economic literature in favor of
the hypothesis that there are generational diﬀerences in saving.
Generally, in response to the original contribution of Shorrocks (1975), at-
tempts to separate the eﬀects of age, period and birth cohort has proved useful in
micro-studies of income, consumption, and wealth. Shorrocks showed that in the
presence of generational diﬀerences, it is impossible to determine whether cross-
section evidence provide a corresponding pattern for the life-cycle or whether
it is the result of observing diﬀerent generations at diﬀerent points in time. As
would be expected from simple life-cycle theory, the main factor determining
cohort eﬀects in these studies has been diﬀerences in productivity growth in
the lifetimes of cohorts (see for example Deaton and Paxton, 1994, Kapteyn,
Alessie and Lusardi, 1999), although many authors also stress the role of gen-
erational diﬀerences in mortality and in preferences. Among these, Kapteyn et
al. (1999) and Jappelli (1999) try to distinguish between alternative hypotheses
that explain cohort eﬀects in wealth, such as mortality rates, expectations about
pension benefits, and historical productivity growth. Also, a few influential con-
tributions (Boskin and Lau, 1988, Attanasio, 1994, 1998) have claimed to find
cohort eﬀects in saving. Attanasio (1998) claims that the cohorts born between
1920 and 1944 are those mainly responsible for the decline in the aggregate sav-
ing rate in the US in the 1980s. However, when Attanasio and Paiella (2001)
used the same data with the addition of three extra years of observation this
eﬀect disappeared, a finding that is given little weight by the authors.
In this paper I argue that the role of generational diﬀerences in saving is
exaggerated. Intuitively, it is not obvious that we will find cohort eﬀects due
to productivity in saving rates. Saving is either defined as the first diﬀerence
in wealth, or as non-consumed income. Given that productivity is assumed
to aﬀect income, consumption, and wealth more or less equally, saving rates
should not display any diﬀerences due to growth. So, if we do find cohort
eﬀects in saving, this might serve as an indicator of generational diﬀerences in
preferences and attitudes. One such commonplace statement is that generations
that have experienced depressions or wars tend to be more prudent or more
patient. However, within the framework of a life-cycle model, a generation
that is characterized as being particularly patient or prudent will save more
while young and less while old, a result that goes against the intuition that the
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current old save much because they belong to a generation with preferences for
high saving.
My main evidence is an empirical analysis based on Norwegian data that
show a tendency for older cohorts to have higher saving rates, but that the
diﬀerences are small and the estimates statistically insignificant. To ensure that
the findings are robust, a variety of econometric specifications and techniques are
employed. This is opposed to the works of Attanasio et al., in which there is very
little information about the robustness of the results. The paper is organized as
follows: Section 2 presents an extended life-cycle/permanent income model with
uncertain income. Also presented are the comparative static eﬀects on saving of
changes in factors such as the time preference rate, the mortality rate, the risk
aversion parameters and the assumed income variance. This serves the purpose
of identifying potential cohort-eﬀects in a traditional model as diﬀerences in
preferences or mortality. In section 3 I give a brief description of the data, while
section 4 reports the model specification, the parameter estimates and the fit of
the econometric model, as well as a discussion of the robustness of the results.
A conclusion is then drawn in section 5.
2 Model
The standard consumption function posits a linear relationship between con-
sumption and ”permanent income”, defined as the annuity value of the sum of
nonhuman wealth and the present discounted value of expected future income.
Under uncertainty, the assumption of a quadratic utility function, which im-
plies no risk aversion, yields a consumption function equal to what it would be
under no uncertainty. This is the smoothing solution, commonly referred to as
the life-cycle or permanent income hypothesis, and is the consumption function
that is routinely used in the literature (Browning and Lusardi, 1996). When
consumption is proportional to the expected present value of lifetime resources,
then savings will be positive when current income is above permanent income
and negative when current income is below. As such, the life-cycle hypothesis
implies that households will accumulate wealth by saving during most of their
working years and then dissave in retirement.
For the purpose of this paper we will need a model that allows for precaution-
ary saving, one in which the third derivative of the utility function is positive.
Hence, I consider a life-cycle model with a utility function with constant ab-
solute risk aversion (CARA) and stochastic income. Given these assumptions
it is possible to obtain a closed-form solution to the problem (see Kimball and
Mankiw, 1989, Caballero, 1991). The model of Irvine and Wang (2001) suits
the purposes of this paper and will be adopted here. Their model is based on
the results in Caballero (1990) who showed that when the instantaneous utility
function is exponential, the return on assets is certain, and income follows an
ARMA process, then we can use the result that the disturbance of the stochas-
tic process of consumption is equal to the annuity value of the innovation in
income. The rest of this section gives a brief description of the model.
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There are two stages in life: work and retirement. The variable T is the
retirement date, after which earnings are lower and less volatile. Some uncer-
tainty about longevity is also introduced through a positive probability (1− p)
of accidental death in each period before reaching a maximum age (T +N),
after which one dies a natural death. A representative agent maximizes the
discounted sum of expected future utility
V (A0) = maxE0
T+N[
t=1
−1
θ
e−θCt

p
1 + δ
t
(1)
subject to an accumulation constraint
At = (1 + r)At−1 −Ct + Yt, t = 1, ..., T +N (2)
AT+N ≥ 0, (3)
where A0 is given, Et is the expectation operator conditional on information
available at time t, θ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, Ct is consumption
and Yt is income, At is the non-human wealth, r is the interest rate, and δ is
the rate of time preference.
The income process is described by
Yt =

Y0 + ξt, 1 ≤ t ≤ T
ξt, T < t ≤ T +N
where it is assumed that {ξt}T+Nt=0 is a random walk defined by
ξt+1 = ξt + εt+1
with ξ0 = 0 and {ξt}T+Nt=0 normally and independently distributed
εt ∼ N

0,σ21

for 1 ≤ t ≤ T
εt ∼ N

0,σ22

for T < t ≤ T +N
Thus, there is a decline in expected income at the time of retirement, and also
a reduction in the expected income variance, since I assume that σ22 < σ
2
1.
2.1 The optimal solution
We can solve the problem in (1) with respect to optimal consumption using
dynamic programming and the result of Caballero (1990). The maximization
gives the consumption function
Ct = Yt − Y0 +K + γ1 (t− T ) + γ2 (T − t¯ ) , 1 ≤ t ≤ T
Ct = Yt +K + γ2 (t− t¯ ) , T < t ≤ T +N
(4)
where the following notation is used
R =
1
1 + r
,
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K =
1
1−RT+N

rA0 +

1−RT

Y0 +

T − 1−R
T
1−R

(γ1 − γ2)

,
t¯ =
1
1−R −
(T +N)RT+N
1−RT+N ,
and
γi =
1
2
θσ2i +
1
θ
ln

p (1 + r)
1 + δ

, i = 1, 2
where γ is called the consumption path’s slope. Consumption in this model
is stochastic as it follows the process of income, with the agent increasing his
consumption when Yt > Y0 and reducing his consumption when Yt < Y0. Fur-
thermore, consumption is proportional to the expected present value of lifetime
resources which consists of non-human wealth (A0) and the present discounted
value as of time t of expected future labor income, expressed by the three first
terms in the bracket of K. The fourth term is the contribution of the precau-
tionary motive, given the random walk. When γi is negative and σ
2
2 < σ
2
1, its
contribution is to reduce the level of consumption.
The consumption path’s slope, γi, is determined by uncertainty on the one
hand, and the ratio between the discount rate and the interest rate on the other
hand. Uncertainty is represented by the degree of risk aversion and variation
in expected income, and will generally have a positive eﬀect on the age-slope.
Uncertainty induces consumers to postpone consumption and therefore tilt the
consumption trajectory down early in life. This generates additional consump-
tion growth. When the discount rate is greater than the interest rate, r < δ,
the consumer prefers to consume today instead of postponing his consumption,
thus exhibiting a kind of impatience. The second term of γi is negative when
r < δ, and for all commonly used parameter values in γi this negative term
is greater than the first positive term. Since I have assumed no trend in the
income process, when γi is negative, consumption will be decreasing with age.
After retirement there is a downward shift due to the decline in expected
income, and there is a negative shift in the age-consumption slope as well since
γ2 < γ1 when σ
2
2 < σ
2
1. The former is in line with the general empirical find-
ing that consumption drops at retirement. This drop can be explained as the
absence of work-related expenditures (see Banks et al., 1998, for a further dis-
cussion). We observe that t¯ represents a kind of ”tilt-point” for the consump-
tion path. Another interpretation is a kind of subjective ”mid-age” that will
depend on the size of the discount factor. If the working period is 45 years
and the retirement period is at most 20 years, then the maximum life-span is
T +N = 45 + 20 = 65. Assume also an interest rate r = 0.03. This gives us an
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approximate value of 23 for the tilt-point t¯, corresponding to the actual age of
43 years old.
The optimal solution for saving defined as non-consumed labor income, St ≡
Yt −Ct, is easily derived from (4)
St = Y0 −K − γ1 (t− T )− γ2 (T − t¯ ) , 1 ≤ t ≤ T
St = −K − γ2 (t− t¯ ) , T < t ≤ T +N
(5)
The model describes an impatient consumer who will prefer more consumption
today rather than deferring consumption to the future. Saving grows with a
factor −γ1 > 0 over the life-cycle until retirement age, then shifting down with
the drop in income at retirement, and continuing to grow with a factor −γ2 > 0
in retirement. Whether saving is positive, negative, or both in retirement de-
pends on the values used in the analysis. Saving continues to grow in retirement
because the agent is still impatient, preferring perhaps not to reduce consump-
tion as much as the drop in income should imply. It is a special feature of the
model that consumption is stochastic, but the implication that consumption
decreases and saving grows over the life cycle is a straightforward consequence
of the assumption that r < δ.
Assuming that the per-period survival rate is constant is an obvious sim-
plification, but letting p decrease with age would only result in overall lower
saving and not change the main results. This follows from (5) since the savings
function describes the optimal solution and expected saving seen from the initial
period.
2.2 Birth cohort specific saving
If there are generational diﬀerences in saving, so-called birth cohort eﬀects or
simply cohort eﬀects, this would be because consumers born in diﬀerent time
periods have diﬀerent paths for saving. Unless it is a characteristic that a co-
hort is born with, such diﬀerences will be due to a cohort being a certain age
at a certain time. For example, a popular notion is that older generations may
be thriftier and more alert to risk than younger generations. Since the model
assumes that preferences are given over the life-cycle, this kind of reasoning
implicitly assumes that preferences are shaped during a cohort’s so-called ”for-
mation years”. This could be the period in which they enter the labor market
and form a household.
2.2.1 Life expectancy
As is known from demography, older cohorts may have a higher probability
of death (lower per period survival probability p) than younger cohorts due
to debilitation eﬀects (see for instance Hobcraft et al., 1982). When younger
generations may have a higher probability of surviving each period, they will
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expect to live longer than previous generations, so that this is analogous to an
increase in expected longevity. Assuming cohort specific mortality gives the
general result that cohorts with a higher per period survival probability will
consume less early in life and have more rapid consumption growth over the life
cycle than cohorts with lower survival probability. From (5) we find that
∂St
∂p
=
1
θp
(t¯− t)
we see that the eﬀect on savings slope is positive for t < t¯ and negative for t > t¯,
given a small increase in p. A person who has a higher probability to survive
each period will save more while young to meet this future contingency, and
consequently save less later in life.
2.2.2 Time preference
Consider next a cohort specific rate of time preference. It is widely held that
older cohorts are more patient than younger cohorts. The very patient initially
consume very little. Consumption then grows as they consume the proceeds of
their extra savings. We would then expect the older cohorts to consume less
when young and have a more rapid consumption growth over the life cycle than
another cohort with a higher time preference rate, all other things equal. We
can derive the eﬀect of δ on saving as
∂St
∂δ
= − 1
θ (1 + δ)
(t¯− t)
An increase in the time preference rate (more impatience) reduces saving when
t < t¯ and increases savings when t > t¯. In the opposite case, a patient consumer
will save more while young and less before retirement, and because of the special
feature of a drop in savings at retirement, he will also save more in the beginning
of the retirement period than an impatient consumer.
2.2.3 Income uncertainty
We would expect that a household that faces increased income uncertainty also
would initially consume less, save more and have a more rapid consumption
growth over the life cycle, all other things equal. Consider first the case of an
increase in expected variation of earned income:
∂St
∂σ1
= θσ1 [T −Φ]− θσ1t, t ≤ T
∂St
∂σ1
= −θσ1Φ, T < t ≤ T +N
where
Φ =
1
(1−RT+N)

T − 1−R
T
1−R

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and where Φ is positive if T >

1−RT

/ (1−R) which can be shown will
hold for T > 0, and for all reasonable values of R,T and N, Φ is also less
than T. Given the parameter values assumed earlier, Φ will be 23.43, which is
numerically close to t¯. Thus, an increase in expected variation of earned income
has an ambiguous eﬀect on saving during the working years, positive as long as
t < [T −Φ] , and negative from then until retirement. The increase in savings
early in life leaves more for consumption in retirement, and reduces savings in
old age.
Turning then to an increase in expected variation of retirement income.
∂St
∂σ2
= θσ2 [Φ+ t¯− T ] , t ≤ T
∂St
∂σ2
= θσ2 [Φ+ t¯]− θσ2t, T < t ≤ T +N
More uncertainty about income in retirement should induce the household to
save more for retirement. The eﬀect on savings for t ≤ T is positive when
Φ > (T − t¯) . It can be shown that this holds for all N ≥ 1 (and R 9= 1). The
eﬀects on savings in retirement is ambiguous, since the precautionary motive
still works for more saving while higher proceeds on previous savings should
yield less saving. From the expression above we see that the eﬀect on saving
is positive as long as [Φ+ t¯] > t, and negative thereafter. However, in my
numerical example [Φ+ t¯] ≈ 46.5 > T = 45, and the eﬀect of higher proceeds
on previous savings would dominate.
2.2.4 Risk aversion
Turning now to the idea that older cohorts are more prudent. Consider a small
increase in the coeﬃcient of risk aversion (= intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution)
∂St
∂θ
=
∂γ1
∂θ
(t¯− t)− 12 [Φ+ t¯− T ]

σ21 − σ22

, t ≤ T
∂St
∂θ
=
∂γ2
∂θ
(t¯− t)− 12Φ

σ21 − σ22

, T < t ≤ T +N
An increase in the coeﬃcient of risk aversion has two eﬀects on saving. First,
it changes the savings slope. Since ∂γi/∂θ =
1
2σ
2
i − 1θ2 ln

p(1+r)
1+δ

> 0, saving
increases for ages t < t¯, and decreases for ages t > t¯. More risk averse consumers
will save more while young, and consequently will save less when approaching
retirement. Second, it has a negative eﬀect on the level because of the diﬀerence
in income variance. Higher degree of risk aversion reduces the value of uncertain
income, and the value of labor income reduces more than retirement income
when

σ21 − σ22

> 0. A person with higher risk aversion will thus transfer less
through savings from the working period to the retirement period.
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2.2.5 Summary
The theory above proceed under the assumption that households are free to
borrow as much as they would like. However, in the period that the sample
covers, credit markets were deregulated. In the case where credit constraints
have been binding, this would have forced the generation to save more when
young and subsequently less when old. After the deregulation in the mid-1980s,
younger cohorts switched from a constrained path to an unconstrained path,
while older cohorts stayed on the constrained path. As such, a deregulation
would cause a shift in the observed slope of the age-profile of saving for diﬀerent
cohorts. As a general result, any potential generational diﬀerence in mortality,
preferences, or expectations, will have an impact both on the slope and on the
level of the age-profile of saving. In the following sections I use Norwegian data
to test whether we can find such diﬀerences in the slope and level of estimated
age-profiles that can be attributable to birth cohort.
3 Data description
The main data source is the Norwegian Survey of Consumer Expenditures
(SCE), which is an annual survey based on two weeks of expenditure account-
ing, with additional interviews. The interviews collect information on house-
hold characteristics, such as age and employment status of all members of the
household, and expenditures that may not be properly covered by a two week
accounting like durables and annual expenses. Thus total consumption ex-
penditure consists of payments of the household during the accounting period,
converted to figures for a whole year through multiplying with 26, together with
the housing expenses and consumer durable purchases recorded in the interview.
Income is added from tax records. The SCE is available for the period 1975-94.
A more detailed description and an evaluation of the quality of the SCE-data
is reported in Halvorsen (2002).
The unit of observation is a household, defined as persons having a common
dwelling and sharing at least one meal per day. It is assumed that the household
acts as a single decision maker so that we can apply the implications from the
model above, and in the following most household characteristics are taken to
be those of the household’s main income earner, sometimes called the household
head. Institutions are not included in the survey. The number of responding
households is on the average 1170 each year, ranging from a minimum of 928 to
a maximum of 1311. This is rather small, considering the large heterogeneity in
variables like consumption and income. The non-response rate is approximately
0.4, where non-response is mainly due to refusal. The SCE contain non-response
weights by household type, and all descriptive statistics below are computed
using these weights.
The definition of household saving in this analysis is after-tax labor income
including pensions and pure transfers, minus expenditures including consumer
durables. Since the tax records have no information about transfers that are not
10
subject to taxes, such transfers are imputed from household characteristics. The
particular choice of savings definition employed above excludes capital income.
In a recent seven country study of household saving (Börsch-Supan, 2001), a dis-
tinction is made between active and passive saving, passive saving being capital
gains that are automatically reinvested. If all capital income is automatically
reinvested, then the definition employed here is equal to active saving. Another
reason for excluding capital income is one of measurement. While negative capi-
tal income is measured almost entirely, consisting principally of interest paid on
mortgages, the corresponding positive receipts of capital income, i.e. imputed
income from owner occupied housing, is inadequately registered. Also, saving
in the theoretical model in section 2 is defined as non-consumed labor income.
There are several diﬃculties with using these data, mainly due to the manner
in which consumption is measured and aggregated. For example, it seems likely
that there are measurement errors both in the registration of expenditures on
durables based on recall, and in the registration of expenditures on non-durables
through scaling up two weeks of purchases. Another source of measurement error
is the lack of exact correspondence between income and consumption. While
income refers to the year of observation, consumer expenditures depends on
when the household has been interviewed. In the interview, questions about
expenditures on durables are phrased ”purchased in the past 12 months”. An
interview done in January will record expenditures on durables in the current
year that were actually made in the year before. There is also a correspondence
problem with the procedure of scaling up two weeks of expenditures to one year.
Households interviewed in December will in most cases yield an observation of a
much higher yearly expenditure (when the two weeks are multiplied by 26) than
other households with the same yearly income interviewed at an earlier date. In
the empirical part of the paper, dummies for month of interview is included as
an attempt to correct for these errors.
In general, the measure of saving will be disturbed by measurement errors in
both expenditures and income, although apparently in no systematic manner.
Furthermore, the SCE saving rates by year seems to fit the National Accounts’
saving rate after some corrections for diverging definitions in the two measures,
even if the micro series exhibit more fluctuation over time (more on this in
Halvorsen, 2002).
3.1 Descriptive statistics
According to the life-cycle or permanent income hypothesis, consumption is
proportional to the expected present value of lifetime resources, and savings will
be positive when current income is above permanent income level and negative
when current income is below. As such, the simple life-cycle hypothesis implies
that households will accumulate wealth by saving during most of their working
years and then dissave in retirement. In the particular version of the life-cycle
model introduced in the previous section, with uncertainty and impatience,
saving increases with age until the drop at retirement.
Table 1 presents the median saving rates of diﬀerent age groups for all years
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Table 1: Saving rates by age and year
All 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74
1975 .11 (.71) .06 (.60) .04 (.68) .11 (.68) .15 (.81) .20 (.74)
1976 .14 (.61) .06 (.57) .05 (.62) .18 (.49) .19 (.64) .28 (.78)
1978 .15 (.66) .07 (.55) .09 (.65) .17 (.62) .21 (.73) .20 (.66)
1979 .16 (.63) .05 (.58) .05 (.57) .18 (.61) .33 (.51) .26 (.79)
1980 .14 (.57) .12 (.52) .09 (.47) .10 (.63) .23 (.67) .27 (.64)
1981 .18 (.61) .12 (.54) .11 (.57) .16 (.62) .32 (.61) .29 (.71)
1982 .19 (.56) .11 (.52) .11 (.51) .22 (.48) .28 (.55) .30 (.74)
1983 .13 (.67) .04 (.57) .06 (.61) .13 (.57) .18 (.69) .31 (.91)
1984 .11 (.68) .06 (.63) .03 (.59) .08 (.79) .20 (.56) .16 (.70)
1985 .11 (.65) .03 (.69) .04 (.55) .13 (.65) .18 (.69) .30 (.77)
1986 .07 (.60) .01 (.72) .00 (.55) .07 (.60) .17 (.52) .17 (.66)
1987 .08 (.63) -.01 (.66) -.02 (.59) .14 (.63) .17 (.56) .23 (.50)
1988 .18 (.55) .08 (.61) .18 (.49) .23 (.42) .21 (.52) .25 (.59)
1989 .12 (.51) .03 (.56) .04 (.48) .10 (.45) .18 (.55) .23 (.43)
1990 .14 (.49) .05 (.54) .14 (.46) .15 (.47) .24 (.52) .21 (.56)
1991 .11 (.56) -.00 (.60) .04 (.48) .16 (.54) .26 (.48) .18 (.54)
1992 .16 (.53) .16 (.54) .11 (.50) .15 (.57) .21 (.59) .24 (.42)
1993 .18 (.48) .07 (.63) .13 (.42) .23 (.47) .21 (.47) .24 (.48)
1994 .22 (.49) .08 (.55) .22 (.43) .21 (.51) .32 (.47) .27 (.53)
Average
no of obs 1171 275 284 224 217 171
Note: Median of all households in each age group, by age of main income earner.
Interquartile range in parenthesis.
Source: Author’s calculations using the SCE and tax records, Statistics Norway
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in the sample. Age refers here to the age of the main income earner in a house-
hold. The medians fluctuate substantially between years, reflecting the overall
problem of large variation in the distribution of saving rates. The distribution
is also very much skewed to the right with large negative outliers. The data
show that saving rates seem to increase steadily with age, showing no decline
for the retired. Actually, the saving rate are remarkable high after the age of
54, where we normally expect saving to peak, and the saving rates of the 65-75
year old are extraordinarily high.
There is a great deal of evidence that old people save, or at least do not dis-
save as implied by the simple life-cycle model without bequests. Such evidence
goes back at least as far as Mirer (1979) and is continuously updated as new
data sets become available. According to many household surveys from around
the world, rates of saving among elderly households are as high or higher than
among younger households, who are supposed to be saving for retirement. De-
spite institutional diﬀerences, such saving patterns have been observed among
the elderly in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy (see
Poterba, 1994, Attanasio, 1998, Börsch-Supan, 2001). These results can be
made consistent with uncertainty about the date of one’s death, the risk of high
unplanned expenditures due to illness or the need of care, the desire for social
status, or the intention to leave an estate to one’s heirs. In a recent Norwegian
survey by NOVA on attitudes toward saving and bequests (Gulbrandsen and
Langsether, 2001), the majority of the households stated to save as a precaution
against unforeseen contingencies, while saving in order to leave an estate was
the second most important motive. The relative weight placed on the diﬀerent
motives did not seem to change with age.
3.2 Synthetic panels method
It is not easy to identify diﬀerence by birth cohort in table 1. The generation
that was 25-34 years old in 1975, would be 35-44 years old in 1984, and so on.
We can compare this generation with the one that is 25-34 years old in 1985 and
35-44 years old in 1995, but table 1 does not give enough information to draw
any conclusion about cohort diﬀerences in this manner. Since no panel data
on Norwegian household consumption and saving are available, one must rely
on repeated cross-sectional data by using the variation in the behavior of each
cohort over time to estimate cohort-specific profiles from several waves of cross-
sectional data. If each year’s cross-section is a random sample, then following
Deaton (1985), it is possible to construct ”synthetic cohort profiles” by linking
together saving rates of i.e. 45-year-olds in year t and 46-year-olds in year t+1.
A cohort is defined as all households whose head is born in a certain period.
In this study, birth cohorts are defined by ten-year bands. Cohort 1 is the eldest
with household heads born between 1905 and 1914 and cohort 6 the youngest
with household heads born between 1955 and 1964. Thus, cohort 5 would be
the ”baby-boom” generation. The cohort definition, the age intervals in 1975
and 1994, and the average cell size is reported in table 2. In the subsequent
analysis I have excluded observations of ages below 25 and above 74, since at
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Table 2: Cohort statistics
Cohort Year of birth Age in 1975 Age in 1994 Av cell size
1 1905-14 61-70 80-89 84∗
2 1915-24 51-60 70-79 206
3 1925-34 41-50 60-69 197
4 1935-44 31-40 50-59 216
5 1945-54 21-30 40-49 295
6 1955-64 11-20 30-39 167∗
* based on 10 to 15 years of observation
Source: Author’s calculations from the SCE, Statistics Norway
Figure 1: Median saving rates by age and cohort
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these ages the combination of age, period and cohort yields too small cells.
This is because the eldest and the youngest cohorts are not observed over the
whole sample period. With this exception, each cohort is observed in every
cross-section, but consists of a diﬀerent set of households each time. Consider
a variable of interest, xchp , observed for household h, belonging to cohort c in
period p, It is always possible to define εchp by the following equation
xchp = δ
c
p + ε
ch
p
where δcp is a measure of location (means, median etc.) for the cell defined as
households belonging to cohort c in period p, and εchp is the deviation from the
measure of location. The age corresponding to cell (c, p) is given as long as
cohorts are identified by year of birth.
The estimated median saving rates for such year-cohort cells against age is
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plotted in figure 1. Each connected segment represents the behavior of a cohort
over the sample period. Since a cohort is defined as a ten-year interval and I have
20 years of data, each cohort overlaps for 10 ages. It is the vertical diﬀerence
between these overlapping segments that may be interpreted as ”cohort-eﬀects”.
Based on the figure it is almost impossible to draw any conclusions because of
the fluctuation of each segment over time. The volatility in the time-series are
principally due to the consumption boom in the mid-1980, but also the large
variation in the micro series in general.
There are essentially two ways of exploring cohort eﬀects empirically. One
is the method of using synthetic panels for graphical illustrations, as in figure
1. This is the principal presentation form used in the International Savings
Comparison Project (Börsch-Supan, 2001), and the basis for Attanasio’s (1998)
conclusions about cohort eﬀects as one of the factors explaining the decline in
the U.S. saving rate. The other way of evaluating the eﬀect of cohorts is through
regression where the aim is to separate the three eﬀects age, period and cohort.
4 Empirical characterization of saving rate pro-
files
4.1 The identification problem
Let a denote the age of a household (head) and p the period of observation,
in this case a calender year. A cohort c is defined by the year of birth of the
household head. The following trivial identity links the three quantities age,
cohort and calender year:
p = c+ a (6)
Studies of consumption and savings often investigate movements in age-
profiles. Consider an age-profile in saving rates (sr)
sr (a, p) = f (a, p) + u (7)
The deterministic function f measures the systematic variation in saving rates
and the error u reflects cyclical or transitory phenomena. For a fixed year
p, the function f (a, p) yields the conventional cross-section. Movements of f
as a function of p describe how cross-sectional saving profiles shift over time.
Recognizing relation (6), the cross-section as a function of age does not describe
life-cycle saving rates for any cohort, or put diﬀerently, the cross-section relation
may very well be the result of cohort eﬀects. In fact, cohort-savings-profiles are
statistically indistinguishable from age-savings-profiles. Saving rates can also
be expressed as a function of cohort and age
g (c, a) ≡ g (p− a, a) ≡ f (a, p) (8)
where the deterministic function g describe how age-savings-profiles diﬀer across
cohorts. Holding age constant g (p− a, a) describes the profile of saving for a
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cohort over time. Holding the cohort constant yields the profile experienced by
a specific cohort over time and age, this being the life-cycle profile.
The identification problem arises because there is no independent variation
in the three variables age, period and cohort. All age eﬀects can be perceived as
a combination of period and cohort eﬀects, all period eﬀects as a combination
of age and cohort etc. In particular, all cohort eﬀects can be seen as a result of
having a certain age in a certain period.
While the problem of identifying eﬀects in age, period and cohort-models is
a general one, it yields multicollinearity in the special case of a linear additive
model. Consider a linear additive version of (7)
sr (a, p) = k0 + ζa+ φp+ u (9)
where k0 is a constant and ζ and φ are parameters. If the parameters are
composite eﬀects ζ ≡ (γ − ρ) and φ ≡ (η + ρ), then we can by (6) rewrite (9)
as
sr (a, p, c) = k0 + γa+ ηp+ ρc+ u (10)
where γ, η and ρ are parameters, the latter corresponding to what we would
call a cohort eﬀect. We have an identification problem if γ, η and ρ are free.
This is solved if one of the three is known, e.g. set to zero.
Despite its restrictive form, the linear additive model is a widely used em-
pirical specification in studies of age, period and cohort eﬀects in household
variables. Because of the multicollinearity problem it is a specification that re-
quires additional restrictions on the parameters, or other ways of solving the
identification problem. Some sort of out-sample-information as a proxy for the
cohort eﬀect was suggested by King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) for wealth equa-
tions and by Heckman and Robb (1985) for earnings equations. Productivity
growth is one such proxy. However, this is also a restrictive approach as it
presupposes, not only that there are in fact cohort eﬀects, but also the specific
source of these eﬀects.
The other approach is to impose additional restrictions on the parameters
in the model. Deaton and Paxon (1994) propose a method that decomposes all
three eﬀects, using an additive model with dummies for each age, period and
cohort, controlling for household characteristics. The multicollinearity problem
is solved by assuming that the period eﬀects sum to zero and by omitting the
first two period dummies1. Plotting the dummy-parameters for each variable
then gives a graphical impression of the decomposition of eﬀects. It can be
shown that applying this method on the saving rates from the Norwegian SCE
data, the estimated parameters for the age dummies (one for each year of age)
suggest that saving rates as a function of age is best represented by a 5th degree
polynomial in age. A 5th degree polynomial takes care of the special features
1This method for solving the multicollinearity problem could be applied to any of the
dummy matrices. Since consumption was the dependent variable in Deaton and Paxon (1994),
it was also assumed that the time eﬀects were orthogonal to a linear trend. According to the
macro series, or the time series of the median, the assumption of a trend is not evident when
studying saving rates.
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that saving increase by age for the young, then stays approximately constant
for households in their thirties and early forties, after which saving grows again,
the slope increasing with age.
Thus a general regression equation for the saving rate of household i in the
sample year p, can be written
srip = k0 +
5[
j=1
γj (a)
j
+ η3Dp + ρ
3
cDc +X
iβ + κ 1
yip
+uip (11)
where Dp and Dc are sets of cohort and year dummies, and X are household
specific variables we want to control for (employment status, area of residence,
female head, number of adults, number of children, homeownership, month of
interview). The η3s are constrained to have zero mean. The dummies for cohort
are normalized on the youngest cohort, while the dummies for period are a
set of T − 2 dummies where, as in Deaton and Paxon, the first two periods are
excluded in the regression. The inverse of household labor income after tax

yip

is included because by construction saving rates become increasingly negative as
income diminishes, yielding extreme negative saving rates for households with
incomes close to zero. Equation (11) is an approximation of a relation where
saving is assumed to be a linear in the age-polynomial, period specific shocks,
cohort and household characteristics, and where it has been transformed to a
saving rate relation by dividing with income. As such we expect the error term
to be proportional with the inverse of income.
It has been argued that age, period and cohort specifications are doomed
to fail with the introduction of constraints because this would necessarily re-
sult in biased estimates, or that even if constraints are technically feasible, they
are practically inadmissible because the chances of making a theoretically cor-
rect restriction—and knowing that you have done so—is negligible (Glenn, 1976).
The Deaton approach relies heavily on the treatment of period eﬀects. The
assumption that the period eﬀects sum to zero in the long run, implying that
the variable period is a proxy for macroeconomic shocks, may not be unreason-
able in this case. However, solving the multicollinearity problem by omitting
two period dummies seem more randomly chosen. On the other hand, I have
attempted to omit other pairs of period dummies and this did not change any
of the main results.
4.2 Problems with measurement errors, heteroskedastic-
ity and outliers
In ordinary least squares (LS) it is assumed that the errors u satisfy, or at least
approximately satisfy, the classical assumptions of constant variance and nor-
mal distribution. In a LS regression on equation (11), all normality tests show
rejection of the normality hypothesis, as do tests of the assumption of constant
variance of u. This implies that the standard errors of the estimates in are in-
correct and any inferences derived from them may thus be misleading. I suspect
that a cause of heteroskedasticity in the saving rate is low income level. This
17
is confirmed by a plot of residuals by income, see appendix C. Low registered
labor incomes may partly be attributed to households that have positive capi-
tal incomes, which is omitted from the income measure, or to households who
have transitory low incomes, in particular some younger households. A closer
inspection of saving rate outliers reveals that some are due to young households,
but the majority of the outliers are households with heads aged 60 or more and
that a majority of the extreme values in this age group can be accounted for by
positive capital income.
Thus both classical assumptions are violated in the LS regression, the distri-
bution is left skewed and the errors are larger the lower the income level. The
most common way of dealing with heteroskedasticity is to give observations with
large variance less weight in the regression. In the next sections I provide re-
gression results for equation (11) using diﬀerent methods of weighting, trimming
and robust regression. I show that even if we may, to a certain extent, meet
the data problems through weighting, it is still diﬃcult to find any significant
eﬀect of including dummy-variables for cohort in the saving rate regressions.
In section 5 I turn to other settings such as data transformation and choosing
saving levels instead of saving rates as the dependent variable. As we shall see,
this does not change the basic insight that cohort eﬀects are weak in the data.
4.3 Regression results
Weighting involves decisions about which outliers should have less weight in the
regression than others. In this case we know that a majority of the outliers are
caused by the construction of the dependent variable, and as the plot of the LS
residuals in appendix C suggests, the variance is proportional to income at least
for incomes less than 350000 kroner. This suggests that an appropriate weight
(w) could be
w =

y2 if y < λ
λ2 if y ≥ λ (12)
with λ = 350000.
The result from using this weight when estimating (11) is presented as model
(2) in table 3. In the first column I report the parameter estimates from the
ordinary least squares regression for comparison. All regressions include a fifth
degree polynomial in age of the household head, household characteristics such
as number of children (and number of children squared) and number of adults,
dummies for self employed head and self-employed spouse, female head, home-
ownership, and two categories of rural area, sparsely populated and densely
populated. A selection of these dummies are presented in table 4. The refer-
ence group is households headed by a male wage-earner, residing in a major city,
and belonging to the youngest birth cohort. Included is also a set of dummies
for the month the interview took place, normalized on August. Finally, there is
a set of restricted time dummies as described in the previous section. The full
set of estimates can be found in appendix E. In the lower part of the table, I
have presented some goodness-of-fit and tests statistics. Since the problems of
18
Table 3: Saving rates regression, Eq. (11)
LS WLS Reweighted LS
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
w = y2 metric trim LTS
Intercept 1.07 (.20) 0.60 (.03) 0.81 (.05) 0.41 (.02)
Sel. dummies:
Birth cohort 1905-14 -0.39 (.31) 0.08 (.04) -0.01 (.07) 0.05 (.03)
Birth cohort 1915-24 -0.21 (.25) 0.04 (.03) -0.01 (.06) 0.02 (.03)
Birth cohort 1925-34 -0.26 (.20) 0.02 (.02) -0.06 (.05) -0.00 (.02)
Birth cohort 1935-44 -0.16 (.14) -0.01 (.01) -0.07 (.03) -0.01 (.02)
Birth cohort 1945-54 -0.07 (.09) -0.01 (.01) -0.00 (.02) -0.01 (.01)
Birth cohort 1955-64 0 0 0 0
Self-employed head -0.13 (.06) -0.00 (.01) -0.05 (.01) 0.02 (.01)
Rural area (spars. pop) 0.39 (.06) 0.16 (.01) 0.25 (.01) 0.15 (.01)
Rural area (dens. pop) 0.20 (.05) 0.06 (.01) 0.10 (.01) 0.06 (.01)
Homeowner -0.02 (.05) -0.05 (.01) -0.07 (.01) -0.03 (.01)
No of children -0.22 (.05) -0.09 (.01) -0.14 (.01) -0.10 (.01)
No of children2 0.03 (.01) 0.01 (.00) 0.02 (.00) 0.01 (.00)
No of adults -0.15 (.03) -0.05 (.00) -0.14 (.01) -0.04 (.01)
adjR2 0.87 0.23 0.71 0.38
Breusch-Pagan 8219 273.5 4101 n.a.
χ2 (2) (< .0001) (< .0001) (< .0001)
Kolmogorov-S 0.342 0.065 0.125 n.a.
(p-value) (< .0100) (< .0100) (< .0100)
Standard errors in parenthesis. The Breusch-Pagan tests the null hypothesis
of homoskedasticity in the variables 1/yi and 1/y2i . The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests the null hypothesis of normality of the standarized residuals. A full set
of regressors for model (2) and (4) is given in appendix E.
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Figure 2: Fitted age-polynomials, saving rates
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Age
sa
v
in
g/
la
bo
r i
n
co
m
e 
af
te
r 
ta
x
the error term concerned non-normality and heteroskedasticity, I have chosen
a test statistic for each. The Kolmogoro-Smirnov-statistic assess the discrep-
ancy between the empirical distribution and the estimated hypothesized normal
distribution of the standardized residuals. The Breusch-Pagan tests the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticity on the variables 1/yi and 1/y2i .
The estimated age-polynomial show that age eﬀects in saving rates are pow-
erful. Saving rates increase steadily over the life-cycle. The main features of
the fitted age-polynomial of model (2) is summarized in Figure 2. The solid
line represents the estimated age-polynomial in a regression similar to model
(2), but without dummies for birth cohort. Two features are worth noticing
in this chart. First, the profiles exhibit a remarkable increase after the age of
50, where we normally would expect saving to peak. Second, the cohort eﬀects
are modest, and even though there is a tendency for the two oldest cohorts
to exhibit higher saving rates at all ages, their cohort segments lie within the
95%-confidence interval (the vertical lines in the figure) of the level of estimated
age-polynomial from a regression without the inclusion of dummies for cohort.
So, the basic insight is that after weighting by income the estimates for
cohort indicate that there is a tendency for the two eldest birth cohorts to save
more than later cohorts. Households with heads born in 1905-14 are estimated
to have saving rates at 8 percentage points higher at all ages than households
with heads born in 1955-64. Put diﬀerently, the results suggest that the baby-
boom generation has saving rates on the average 3-5 percentage points lower
than generations born before the II World War. Compared to the magnitudes of
the age eﬀect, this does not amount to very much. Leaving out capital income
in the definition of income skews the estimated age profile, underestimating
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saving rates for old ages and overestimating saving rates for young ages, but
does not change the conclusion about the cohort-eﬀects. We observe also that
the standard errors increase for the eldest generations, making the estimates
insignificantly diﬀerent from each other at conventional statistical levels. The
errors probably increase for several reasons. First, we have fewer observations
of the oldest cohorts. Second, to the extent that we have been able to separate
age eﬀects and birth cohort eﬀect, the period of observation is not long enough
to escape the fact that observations of early generations are still observations
of old households. Finally, we must remember that in Western Europe, the
cohort born in the mid-1920s is the first to have an uninterrupted 40-year work
history, not punctuated by wars, inflations and political turmoil. As such, the
estimates for cohort eﬀects do not provide reason to explain the cross-sectional
observation of very high saving among the elderly primarily as generational, but
that the high saving must be due to other reasons such as precautionary saving
or a bequest motive.
The results in table 3 also reveal a powerful impact of region and the demo-
graphic composition of the household upon the saving rate. Region has a strong
and consistent pattern of influence upon household saving in all years. Relative
to a household in one of the major cities (Oslo, Bergen or Trondheim), a house-
hold with similar characteristics in sparsely populated areas have significantly
higher saving rates, on the average about 16 percentage points higher. Reasons
for this may be a combination of attitudes and availability of consumer goods
and services. In more densely populated areas the saving rates are around 6
percentage points higher than in the major cities. The number of children aged
19 or younger has a large and significantly negative impact on household saving,
an additional child lowers household saving by 9 percentage points. Despite the
increase in income through child benefits and tax deductions, these transfers are
seldom enough to meet the costs of having children, considering that families
with dependent children tend to be more established and established in larger
dwellings than households of the same age and characteristics but without chil-
dren. It is usual to assume some advantages of scale in the household since some
goods consumed may be considered as collective goods. However, we observe
that the number of adults aﬀects the saving rate negatively. The same result
appears when the variable ’number of adults’ is replaced with the variable ’num-
ber of heads’. While the negative eﬀect of having more than two adults in the
household is intuitive when the additional adult is a child 20 years or older (as
in most cases in the sample), or an elderly dependent parent, it is not so clear
in the case of going from one to two adults. It is possible that couples are more
likely than singles to be established, have mortgages and invest in durables, but
this is just a presumption.
The dummy for self-employed head seems important in the least squares fit,
but is rendered insignificant after weighting by income. This suggests that the
measurement errors in income is greater for this group than for wage-earners.
The distinction between renters and homeowners is made for two reasons. In the
first place, the initial conditions for the two groups are diﬀerent, one has housing
wealth and the other has not. As income from housing is not included in the
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income concept, but rental payments on mortgage loans are entirely included
in housing consumption, we would expect the saving concept employed to give
lower saving for homeowners than for renters. Lower saving for homeowner may
also be the result of wealth eﬀects in consumption, although such eﬀects are
still discussed in the empirical literature. The coeﬃcient in table 3 is in fact
significantly negative, confirming the assumptions above.
Next, I consider the goodness-of-fit and the test statistics. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic is less than .01, thus outside the range of critical values given by
Stephens (1974) and rejecting the normality hypothesis. However, the statistic
in the weighed least squares is half the size of the statistic in the ordinary least
squares regression. The Breusch-Pagan test still rejects homoskedasticity in
income after weighting by income, and in this respect one might find the statistic
too large. Nevertheless, compared to the least squares statistic it shows a large
improvement. Obviously, when outliers have less weight in the regression, the
estimated model will also explain less of the overall variance. This is why the
R-squared is considerably smaller in the weighted least squares regression than
in the least squares regression.
In appendix E the full set of regressors are presented, among these are the
dummies for month of interview and the restricted years dummies. Note that
Christmas shopping influences strongly expenditures recorded in December, and
subsequently expenditures recorded in January are overall lower than in other
months. The estimates from the restricted year dummies are close to the sample
median saving rate by year, confirming the impression that this restriction does
not disturb the other estimates in any significant manner. However, this must
be considered along with the initial restriction of assuming linear separability
in age, period, and cohort eﬀects. The decomposing of eﬀects based on simple
additive models implicitly assume that age eﬀects are the same for each cohort
and period, period eﬀects are the same for each age level and cohort, and cohort
eﬀects are the same for each age level and period. For example, macroeconomic
fluctuations are taken to influence all ages or all birth cohorts in the same way.
In view of the fact that during the time period observed, Norwegian households
experienced liberalization in both the credit market and the housing market,
periods of high unemployment and large changes in the real interest rate, it
would seem like a crude approximation to assume that all households were
aﬀected in the same way by these factors.
4.3.1 Does the age-slope vary with cohort?
Another specification is one where some kind of interaction between age and
cohort is assumed. As pointed out by Heckman and Robb (1985), the intro-
duction of higher-order interaction does not solve the identification problem (or
the multicollinearity problem). Still, one may argue that additive models such
as the ones presented above are too simple and that there may be potentially
meaningful interactions between the variables. In section 2 it was shown that
conceivable cohort specific parameters in a life-cycle model could change both
the intercept and the slope of the age-savings profile. This would indicate that
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Table 4: Saving rate regression, eq. (14)
Model (5)
WLS
Level (ρc) Slope (bc)
Birth cohort 1905-14 0.02 (0.05) 0.39 (0.57)
Birth cohort 1915-24 0.03 (0.03) -0.13 (0.51)
Birth cohort 1925-34 0.02 (0.02) -0.39 (0.71)
Birth cohort 1935-44 -0.14 (0.01) -0.09 (1.33)
Birth cohort 1945-54 -0.17 (0.01) 1.31 (2.53)
Birth cohort 1955-64 0 -1.57 (1.99)
adjR2 0.23
Standard errors in parenthesis.
an econometric specification including an age-cohort interaction would be more
appropriate. I still assume that period eﬀects are the same for each age level
and each cohort, and apply the same restrictions on the period dummies as in
the previous section. However, a pure age-cohort interaction with age repre-
sented as a fifth degree polynomial will inevitably lead to an unwieldy amount
of parameters. The following approach is an alternative.
Denote the estimated age-polynomial from equation (11) as
pˆ (a) =
5[
j=1
γˆj (a)
j (13)
where a is actual age. Rescaling the age variable as deviation from the tilt-point
(t¯R) in the theoretical section, we can also rescale the estimated polynomial as
a function of the deviation from the tilt-point, pˆ (a˜) , where a˜ = a − t¯R =
a− 43. The variable pˆ (a˜) is then used in a new regression model with specified
interaction between the polynomial, age and dummies for each cohort in the
following manner
srip = k0 + b0pˆ (a˜) + b
3
cpˆ (a˜)
a˜
50
Dc + η
3
pDp + ρ
3
cDc +X
iβ+uip (14)
Here I allow for the polynomial to tilt around t¯R, with the parameters bc re-
flecting that diﬀerent cohorts may have diﬀerent age-slopes, in addition to the
ρc’s that account for cohort-specific levels. It is thus assumed that the shape of
the age-profile is common for all cohorts.
The results of the estimation is presented in table 4, showing only the es-
timated bˆc’s and ρˆc’s. Adding a cohort specific slope coeﬃcient to the age
polynomial changes somewhat the estimated level coeﬃcients. In this case, we
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get a significant drop in the saving rates level for the 1935-54 cohorts. How-
ever, in view of the fact that the slope coeﬃcients are insignificantly diﬀerent
from zero, and the goodness-of-fit and test statistics remain unchanged, the
alternative specification in (14) does not seem more suitable than the simple
additive model to analyze cohort-eﬀects. In this respect, it is not obvious that
the dummy coeﬃcients for the 1935-44 and 1945-54 generations provide any
new and altering evidence on the cohort eﬀects.
4.4 Robustness of the results
An alternative to assuming a specific functional form of the variance, is trimming
of means and robust regression that treat outliers as gross errors or corruption
in the data. The easiest way is to apply a re-weighting procedure with so called
metric trimming, which gives large outliers in the LS regression no influence at
all. In this case the weights (w) are constructed as
w =

1 if
ri
σ
 ≤ λ
0 if
ri
σ
 > λ (15)
for some level of the constant λ, where ri is the residual. The result of this
procedure when λ = 2 is presented in the third column of table 3 as model (3)2.
However, re-weighting on the basis of ordinary least squares residuals may be
misleading since the LS fit has already been pulled in the direction of deviating
observations. Thus an outlier might a have much smaller LS residual than the
resulting residual from a more robust regression. Robust regression is used as a
term that covers many methods which try to design estimators that are not too
strongly influenced by outliers. The sample mean of a dependent variable can
be upset completely by a single outlier. This contrasts with the sample median
which is little aﬀected. We say that the median is resistant to gross errors while
the mean is not. Many robust methods are therefore aimed at using the median
as the estimator of location in the regression model.
Among these methods the least median of squares (LMS) minimizes the
median of the squared residuals.
min
q
med
i
r2i
r
and the least trimmed squares method (LTS) minimizes the sum of the h small-
est squared residuals:
min
h[
i=1

r2

i:n
where (i : n) represents an ascending ordering of the squared residuals (r) , and
h =
n+ p+ 1
2
2 I find that more sophisticated re-weighting based on M-estimators like the Huber-
estimator or the Hampel-estimator do not yield results that diﬀer much from the simple
procedure in (15).
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where n is the number of observations and p is the number of estimated para-
meters (Rousseeuw, 1984). If h = n then the LTS fit equals the least squares fit.
Applied on small data sets the two methods give the same result, but Rousseeuw
and Leroy (1987) has shown that the least trimmed squares method is statisti-
cally more eﬃcient than the least median of squares method for large data sets.
However, the LTS estimator is still computational intense, in particular when
the number of right hand side variables is large. In table 4 the LTS is based
on a new and improved algorithm (Rousseeuw and Van Driessen, 1998) and the
results presented in the fourth column as model (4) are from a re-weighted least
squares regression using the weights returned from LTS.
Not surprisingly, the two re-weighting procedures described above reduce
all standard errors. The dummy for self-employed has reduced influence after
trimming, since this group represent sources for measurement errors, and is likely
to be given zero weight in the re-weighting procedure. The variable number of
children in the household and the dummy for residing in sparsely inhabited
areas, both have coeﬃcients that become somewhat smaller and more accurate
after trimming, but remain important variables in determining the household
saving rate.
The LTS re-weighting yields a further reduction in the standard errors com-
pared to the metric trimming, but the cohort eﬀects are still not significantly
diﬀerent from each other, although the pattern now indicates slightly higher
saving rates for the two eldest birth cohorts. Yet, the errors are not reduced
enough to render the cohort eﬀects statistically significant for each other at any
conventional level.
Judging from these results and the test-statistics, my preferred specifica-
tion is model (2). The LTS-method is considered to be very robust and it is
therefore interesting that models (2) and (4) yield such similar results. This
indicates that the extreme value and variance problem is indeed determined by
heteroskedasticity in income.
Alternatively, heteroskedasticity with respect to an economic magnitude is
usually approximately removed if the regression equation is applied to its loga-
rithm. This is why log-transformation of a variable is widely used on household
variables like consumption and income. Log-transformation suppresses extreme
values but require initially positive values and is therefore not feasible when
dealing with savings. An alternative is to use the average propensity to con-
sume (c/y = 1− s/y) and translate the results back to saving rates afterwards.
Since the data used in the regression contains no negative or zero labor incomes
it is possible to take logs of the average propensity to consume, and we get the
following equation for estimation3
ln cip = ln y
i
p + k˜0 +
5[
j=1
γ˜j (a)
j
+ η˜3Dp + ρ˜
3
cDc +X
iβ˜+u˜ip (16)
3 In most empirical consumption studies the polynomial in age is assumed to be of third
degree, but for the purpose of translating back to saving rates I will keep the 5th degree
polynomial.
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Table 5: Log consumption regression, Eq. (16)
LS WLS

w = y2

Model (6) Model (7)
ln yi 0.28 (.01) 0.54 (.01)
Selected dummies:
Birth cohort 1905-14 -0.03 (.06) -0.09 (.06)
Birth cohort 1915-24 -0.05 (.05) -0.05 (.04)
Birth cohort 1925-34 -0.03 (.04) -0.03 (.03)
Birth cohort 1935-44 -0.00 (.03) -0.01 (.02)
Birth cohort 1945-54 -0.00 (.02) 0.00 (.01)
Birth cohort 1955-64 0 0
Self-employed head -0.03 (.01) -0.05 (.01)
Rural area (spars. pop.) -0.33 (.01) -0.24 (.01)
No of children 0.20 (.01) 0.12 (.01)
No of children2 -0.03 (.00) -0.02 (.00)
No of adults 0.20 (.01) 0.08 (.01)
adjR2 0.48 0.40
Breusch-Pagan 2036 689.4
χ2 (2) (< .0001) (< .0001)
Kolmogorov-S 0.031 0.057
(p-value) (< .0100) (< .0100)
Standard errors in parenthesis. Breusch-Pagan test of
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity in variables
1/yi and 1/y
2
i . The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests the
null hypothesis of normality of the standardized residuals.
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Figure 3: Fitted age polynomials, saving level
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Table 5 presents in the first column the LS fit of equation (16), labelled
as model (6). As expected, income is a prime determinant of spending. The
Breusch-Pagan test for model (6) and the plot of residuals against income in
appendix D show that the LS residuals in model (6) are still highly heteroscedas-
tic, even after the transformation. On the other hand the plot in appendix D
also suggests that the log-transformation has reduced somewhat the problem
of large outliers and made the distribution by income considerably more sym-
metric. It seems like the variance function in (12) can be sensible also in a
weighted least squares for log consumption. The result is presented as model
(7) in table 5. The general eﬀect of transformation is the same as for trimming
and robust estimation, standard errors are reduced, but not enough to make the
cohort eﬀects significant. As is seen by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the
log-transformation does well in dealing with the skewness problem, but overall
not much better than weighting by income in the previous section.
The life-cycle hypothesis have implications about consumption and saving,
and not directly about saving rates. Add to this that saving rates are noisy by
construction, and thus a problematic variable empirically, and it is perhaps not
surprising that most studies of household saving describe saving levels instead
of rates. In figure 3 I report the fitted age polynomial for saving levels with and
without the estimated cohort specific levels in a figure similar to figure 2. The fit
is based on a weighted least squares regression of saving levels against income, a
fifth-degree polynomial in age, and the same controls as in the previous regres-
sion models. On the other hand, while the permanent income theory predicts
that current consumption should be independent of current income, saving as
the residual will be dependent of fluctuations in current income. Moreover, for
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the purpose of policy evaluations we are more interested in saving rates than
saving levels.
5 Conclusion
It seems that as a matter of theory, generational diﬀerences in preferences and
expectations should manifest itself in both the level and the slope of the age-
savings rate profile. The empirical evidence provided in this paper show a
tendency for the eldest cohorts to exhibit higher saving rates for all ages, but
that these diﬀerences are small and insignificant. In particular, they are small
compared to the age-eﬀect on saving. Extending the specification to allow for
variable slopes as well as levels of the age-saving profile does not improve on
this result. However, because of the short panel, the oldest cohorts are only
observed at ages where the saving rates also exhibit large variation. There
are other reasons why we would expect more noise around the estimates of
retired households. There are fewer observations of the old birth cohorts because
institutionalized elderly are omitted from the sample. Moreover, it is reasonable
to assume that skewness of income within an age-group rise with age, which
would have eﬀect if saving rates depend on level of income.
The upshot is that based on consumption and income data for Norwegian
households in the period 1975-94, there seems to be weak evidence for any co-
hort eﬀects that might explain high saving in retired households. Nor is there
any reason to believe that the aggregate saving rate will be aﬀected by the
”baby-boom”-generation, other than by its size. Generally, the lack of strong
generational diﬀerences in saving suggest that one should put less emphasis on
explaining cohort eﬀects in consumption and wealth as due to, for instance, pa-
tience or prudence, and more emphasis on explaining cohort eﬀects as diﬀerences
in productivity growth.
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A Selected statistics by cohort
Birth cohort 1905-14
Consumption Labor income Fraction of Number of
Mean Age Mean Std Mean Std Homeowners Self-empl. Adults Children Obs.
1975 65 49041 41145 55289 33791 0.66 0.12 2.0 0.2 186
1976 66 48943 40373 58741 38078 0.69 0.17 2.0 0.2 177
1978 67 47069 30170 56447 34439 0.62 0.11 1.9 0.1 277
1979 69 43081 36624 51080 31194 0.66 0.14 1.8 0.1 179
1980 69 39513 24250 50368 30956 0.51 0.05 1.7 0.0 113
1981 70 39002 26022 51287 31029 0.59 0.07 1.7 0.1 143
1982 71 37844 23402 48667 29283 0.62 0.09 1.7 0.1 116
1983 71 34033 27815 46020 29296 0.67 0.14 1.7 0.0 98
1984 72 40719 21576 48638 25937 0.66 0.12 1.8 0.0 75
1985 72 32685 21867 49782 29611 0.65 0.02 1.7 0.0 72
1986 73 40963 24665 47941 24918 0.72 0.03 1.7 0.0 52
1987 73 53078 54559 50463 23795 0.81 0.05 1.8 0.0 34
1988 74 43067 28640 51881 21438 0.73 0.03 1.5 0.0 24
Birth cohort 1915-24
Consumption Labor income Fraction of Number of
Mean Age Mean Std Mean Std Homeowners Self-empl. Adults Children Observations
1975 55 65794 42338 70617 40203 0.73 0.17 2.1 0.7 255
1976 56 68368 41209 81605 37048 0.70 0.18 2.2 0.6 245
1978 59 62790 43974 72798 40597 0.66 0.13 2.1 0.4 407
1979 60 58642 40325 75382 40440 0.67 0.14 2.0 0.3 273
1980 61 52532 41311 62499 38622 0.63 0.14 1.8 0.2 196
1981 61 53297 39446 68981 38026 0.72 0.15 1.9 0.2 265
1982 62 52311 37237 64588 36756 0.72 0.12 1.8 0.2 245
1983 63 51845 39871 59444 34259 0.69 0.12 1.7 0.1 242
1984 64 52162 36407 60994 38140 0.71 0.11 1.7 0.1 229
1985 65 52394 34765 59937 33332 0.71 0.10 1.7 0.1 252
1986 67 54815 32798 64051 34329 0.79 0.11 1.7 0.1 211
1987 67 51869 34539 64462 36361 0.83 0.14 1.7 0.1 179
1988 68 49212 42710 60640 37005 0.80 0.07 1.6 0.0 188
1989 69 42649 29492 52490 27593 0.78 0.07 1.5 0.0 160
1990 70 45053 35165 56290 29884 0.79 0.06 1.6 0.0 169
1991 71 49632 43125 53939 28795 0.83 0.04 1.6 0.0 142
1992 71 49410 38501 59584 32815 0.81 0.07 1.6 0.1 81
1993 72 44448 26970 58620 25912 0.86 0.04 1.6 0.0 53
1994 72 51236 32203 64942 31003 0.93 0.09 1.6 0.0 51
Birth cohort 1925-34
Consumption Labor income Fraction of Number of
Mean Age Mean Std Mean Std Homeowners Self-empl. Adults Children Observations
1975 46 77217 40107 77406 36144 0.74 0.16 2.4 1.5 183
1976 47 82055 49716 86980 36291 0.69 0.14 2.3 1.5 191
1978 49 82516 51057 89678 40063 0.71 0.17 2.4 1.1 229
1979 50 81630 49345 89671 41640 0.74 0.22 2.4 1.2 236
1980 51 84006 80044 89181 40529 0.71 0.19 2.1 1.0 190
1981 52 83575 50563 92755 37591 0.72 0.17 2.3 0.8 244
1982 53 76705 41875 97067 42992 0.73 0.11 2.2 0.7 231
1983 54 79740 52893 86857 41468 0.76 0.13 2.2 0.7 259
1984 54 79469 53804 88329 42346 0.79 0.16 2.1 0.6 240
1985 55 78398 51346 89889 46647 0.81 0.12 2.1 0.6 203
1986 57 86606 60130 89823 45328 0.93 0.17 2.0 0.4 215
1987 57 90580 63114 97745 50702 0.92 0.13 2.1 0.4 183
1988 59 82509 55193 98313 49065 0.92 0.13 1.9 0.3 213
1989 60 72723 43784 85820 44973 0.93 0.15 1.9 0.2 162
1990 61 66063 44134 75116 40245 0.87 0.11 1.8 0.2 165
1991 62 62288 46084 74049 39927 0.89 0.08 1.8 0.2 157
1992 62 63557 41665 78718 43556 0.91 0.09 1.6 0.1 121
1993 64 59796 35968 76225 39410 0.86 0.06 1.6 0.1 132
1994 65 56969 37932 78724 40652 0.88 0.13 1.6 0.1 125
29
Birth cohort 1935-44
Consumption Labor income Fraction of Number of
Mean Age Mean Std Mean Std Homeowners Self-empl. Adults Children Observations
1975 35 75513 44660 73024 28942 0.57 0.14 2.0 1.9 181
1976 36 88561 58740 84053 27987 0.63 0.15 2.1 2.1 202
1978 38 85754 47854 82886 32354 0.63 0.13 2.1 1.9 189
1979 39 85456 42454 84338 33524 0.62 0.13 2.1 1.8 240
1980 40 82169 46420 85672 31446 0.66 0.14 2.0 1.6 179
1981 42 91726 48588 94751 35326 0.72 0.15 2.2 1.7 255
1982 42 88536 43479 96610 41034 0.72 0.18 2.2 1.6 249
1983 43 103357 53069 102229 41206 0.71 0.12 2.1 1.6 214
1984 44 106744 59041 101175 43504 0.77 0.15 2.2 1.4 219
1985 45 100003 61292 101635 44677 0.74 0.13 2.1 1.3 208
1986 46 106477 60952 107611 46761 0.92 0.14 2.2 1.1 233
1987 47 104638 60706 106602 51738 0.94 0.13 2.1 1.0 198
1988 48 106355 57444 125055 54751 0.91 0.19 2.2 1.0 225
1989 49 95553 54636 101478 43989 0.90 0.14 2.1 0.8 192
1990 50 92878 53658 102575 45815 0.94 0.15 2.1 0.7 192
1991 51 95511 66299 104667 49881 0.95 0.11 2.1 0.6 214
1992 52 92603 55224 105190 54433 0.88 0.14 2.0 0.4 247
1993 53 82568 49614 119620 119924 0.90 0.15 1.8 0.3 208
1994 54 93688 51415 120297 63622 0.94 0.15 2.0 0.4 201
Birth cohort 1945-54
Consumption Labor income Fraction of Number of
Mean Age Mean Std Mean Std Homeowners Self-empl. Adults Children Observations
1975 28 68850 36199 65279 26786 0.21 0.09 1.8 0.9 97
1976 28 66007 28260 63519 24563 0.29 0.05 1.8 1.1 134
1978 29 74762 38559 75812 29265 0.36 0.14 1.9 1.3 202
1979 30 72356 43809 71341 28479 0.35 0.12 1.8 1.2 315
1980 31 75582 39642 78694 26890 0.44 0.10 1.9 1.3 241
1981 32 76119 40732 80813 30133 0.46 0.09 1.9 1.4 339
1982 33 74649 35013 80804 30050 0.56 0.14 1.9 1.5 319
1983 34 88435 45012 86404 32748 0.59 0.15 1.9 1.6 331
1984 34 85417 42580 85035 36266 0.64 0.13 1.8 1.5 346
1985 35 95324 48198 90806 37820 0.66 0.13 1.9 1.6 353
1986 37 105417 59075 97426 38032 0.81 0.14 1.9 1.5 342
1987 38 99486 52882 92909 37409 0.81 0.14 1.8 1.4 287
1988 38 103007 55442 117323 53087 0.84 0.14 1.8 1.4 347
1989 40 103458 52342 102722 39896 0.92 0.13 1.9 1.4 278
1990 40 96562 50116 103769 40919 0.86 0.07 1.9 1.4 243
1991 41 102902 56801 100567 40481 0.88 0.12 1.9 1.2 264
1992 42 106852 65512 111329 47595 0.90 0.13 2.0 1.4 389
1993 44 97525 53782 114338 52002 0.86 0.12 1.9 1.1 366
1994 45 101820 54400 119431 52766 0.86 0.12 1.9 1.1 377
Birth cohort 1955-64
Consumption Labor income Fraction of Number of
Mean Age Mean Std Mean Std Homeowners Self-empl. Adults Children Observations
1980 25 49170 20149 59525 17532 0.00 0.00 1.6 0.2 9
1981 25 72732 40095 69642 28316 0.20 0.03 1.7 0.6 58
1982 26 62475 24647 67920 31275 0.25 0.04 1.7 0.7 67
1983 27 72747 30170 70131 31039 0.31 0.06 1.7 0.7 107
1984 27 80718 49213 74213 31179 0.44 0.10 1.8 0.9 133
1985 28 87469 47001 82353 34662 0.39 0.10 1.8 0.9 198
1986 28 88515 46741 82220 35630 0.63 0.09 1.7 0.7 227
1987 29 94632 54958 83654 35197 0.75 0.10 1.7 0.8 195
1988 29 87277 44512 93719 45258 0.70 0.07 1.7 0.9 249
1989 30 88023 53289 84656 34811 0.62 0.04 1.7 0.9 242
1990 31 95008 49469 94856 39889 0.71 0.10 1.7 1.2 266
1991 31 92283 54482 86124 37925 0.71 0.10 1.6 1.0 311
1992 32 90584 49953 97246 42933 0.71 0.08 1.7 1.1 356
1993 33 90053 54200 95437 52997 0.61 0.09 1.6 1.0 356
1994 34 86009 49219 99875 65117 0.69 0.09 1.6 1.2 391
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B Selected variables by age and cohort
Mean ln(labor income) by age & cohort
10
10.2
10.4
10.6
10.8
11
11.2
11.4
11.6
11.8
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 61 66 71
Age
Mean ln(consumption) by age & cohort
10
10.2
10.4
10.6
10.8
11
11.2
11.4
11.6
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 61 66 71
Age
31
Homeownership rate by age & cohort
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No of persons in the household by age & cohort
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C LS residuals, saving rate regression
Plot of residuals from the least squares regression of equation (11).
34
D LS residuals, ln consumption regression
Plot of residuals from the least squares regression of equation (19).
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E Saving rate equation (11)
Model (2) Model (4)
WLS LTS
Intercept 0.597 (.026) 0.411 (.021)
1/yi -32719 (586) -11920 (127)
Age of household head 0.002 (.001) 0.003 (.001)
Age2/100 0.019 (.008) 0.016 (.008)
Age3/1000 0.004 (.003) 0.007 (.003)
Age4/10000 -0.005 (.003) -0.008 (.003)
Age5/100000 0.001 (.001) 0.002 (.001)
No of children -0.092 (.005) -0.099 (.005)
No of children2 0.012 (.001) 0.014 (.001)
No of adults -0.053 (.003) -0.042 (.003)
Dummy variables:
Birth cohort 1905-14 0.075 (.038) 0.045 (.034)
Birth cohort 1915-24 0.039 (.029) 0.020 (.028)
Birth cohort 1925-34 0.019 (.023) -0.003 (.022)
Birth cohort 1935-44 -0.008 (.016) -0.013 (.017)
Birth cohort 1945-54 -0.009 (.010) -0.014 (.009)
Birth cohort 1955-64 0 0
Self-employed -0.001 (.007) 0.015 (.007)
Self-employed spouse 0.013 (.009) 0.022 (.011)
Female head 0.037 (.007) 0.010 (.006)
Homeowner -0.046 (.006) -0.025 (.006)
Rural area (spars.pop.) 0.162 (.007) 0.151 (.007)
Rural area (dens.pop.) 0.058 (.006) 0.059 (.006)
January 0.114 (.009) 0.091 (.009)
February 0.074 (.011) 0.039 (.010)
March 0.066 (.010) 0.045 (.010)
April 0.069 (.011) 0.050 (.010)
May 0.037 (.011) 0.019 (.010)
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(cont.) Model (2) Model (4)
June 0.010 (.011) -0.014 (.011)
July 0.003 (.011) 0.002 (.011)
September 0.006 (.010) -0.018 (.010)
October -0.011 (.010) -0.027 (.010)
November 0.003 (.011) -0.009 (.011)
December -0.136 (.011) -0.101 (.011)
1977 -0.046 (.013) 0.035 (.011)
1978 0.026 (.013) 0.027 (.011)
1979 0.026 (.014) 0.007 (.011)
1980 0.047 (.015) 0.030 (.012)
1981 0.039 (.014) 0.032 (.011)
1982 0.072 (.014) 0.041 (.011)
1983 -0.010 (.014) -0.022 (.011)
1984 -0.026 (.015) -0.014 (.012)
1985 -0.042 (.015) -0.103 (.012)
1986 -0.097 (.015) -0.091 (.013)
1987 -0.087 (.016) -0.002 (.012)
1988 0.010 (.015) -0.079 (.013)
1989 -0.073 (.015) -0.051 (.014)
1990 -0.040 (.016) -0.073 (.014)
1991 -0.065 (.017) -0.050 (.014)
1992 -0.053 (.017) -0.028 (.014)
1993 -0.009 (.017) 0.000 (.015)
1994 0.003 (.018) 0.411 (.021)
AdjR2 0.23 0.38
Breusch-Pagan 273.5 n.a.
χ2 (2) (< .0001)
Kolmogorov-S 0.065 n.a.
(p-value) (< .0100)
Standard errors in parenthesis. The Breusch-Pagan tests the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity of covariates 1/yi and 1/y
2
i . The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests the null
hypothesis of normality of the standarized residuals. The dummies are normalized on
a male household head, one who is a wage earner and residing in one of the major
cities (Oslo, Bergen or Trondheim), born in the birth cohort 1955-64, and doing the
the two weeks of consumer expenditure reporting in August.
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